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REDEFINING THE STANDARD: WHO CAN BE A PERSON 
LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CARE OF A CHILD 
UNDER THE FAMILY COURT ACT? 
Alexsis Gordon* 
 
COURT OF APPEALS OF NEW YORK 
IN RE TRENASIA J. 1 
(DECIDED MAY 5, 2015) 
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Raising a child often involves a shared obligation, if not a 
“village.”2  The persons taking on this responsibility may include 
parents, significant others of the parents, stepparents, or babysitters.3  
Under the New York Family Court Act, children are protected from 
abuse or neglect by those who are legally responsible for them.4  
While a child’s parents are certainly legally responsible for their own 
child (absent adoption or termination of parental rights), more 
difficulty lies in determining who else is a “person legally 
responsible” (“PLR”) for the child other than the parents.5  Section 
1012(g) of the Family Court Act provides that a “[p]erson legally 
responsible includes the child’s custodian, guardian [or] any other 
person responsible for the child’s care at the relevant time.”6  The 
 
*J.D. Candidate 2017, Touro College Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; B.S. 2014, 
Farmingdale State College. I would like to thank my mother, who has taught me to be 
fearless and driven. A special dedication to my father for his humor, strength and kindness. 
To my brother, thank you for always being by my side. I would also like to thank my 
grandmothers, aunts, uncles, cousins, nephew and boyfriend for their love and unwavering 
support. Finally, thank you to the Touro Law Review staff especially Professor Rena 
Seplowitz and my Note Editors. 
1  32 N.E.3d 378, 383 (N.Y. 2015). 
2 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012 (McKinney 2016), practice commentaries, Merril Sobie 
[hereinafter “Merril Sobie”].  
3 Id. 
4 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012 (McKinney 2009).  
5 Id. 
6 Id. at § 1012(g).  
1
Gordon: Redefining the Standard
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
518 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
statutory definition for PLR extends to persons who are not related to 
the child but are tasked with the care for, and responsibility of, the 
child. 
While the statute clearly states that a person legally 
responsible for the child’s care is a proper respondent, courts have 
had trouble interpreting exactly who is a PLR because the definition 
may encompass people who are not within the statute’s purview.  
Applying the PLR definition, the courts have adopted a 
“commonsense approach”;7 however, something less subjective is 
needed.  What may be common sense to one person is not necessarily 
common sense to others.  In In re Yolanda D.8 the Court of Appeals 
established a test, which weighs several factors to determine whether 
an individual is a proper PLR for the care of a child.9  The Court of 
Appeals enumerated these factors as a way to “illustrate some of the 
salient considerations in making an appropriate [PLR] 
determination.”10  However, the courts give too much weight to the 
relationship between the respondent and the subject child’s parents, 
which is merely one of several factors to be considered in 
determining who is a PLR, none of which is outcome determinative.11 
This note will examine a recent case before the New York 
Court of Appeals, In re Trenasia J.,12 where the court considered the 
issue of whether a child’s uncle was a PLR for the child, as defined 
by Family Court Act § 1012(g).13  The Court of Appeals in In re 
Trenasia J., based on the factors established in In re Yolanda D., held 
that the evidence amply supported a finding that the respondent was a 
PLR for the child’s care.14  This note will unravel the factors New 
York courts consider in making a PLR determination, specifically 
focusing on when a non-parent, non-legal guardian can be a PLR for 
the care of a child.  Part II will discuss the history and background of 
section 1012(g).  Part III will discuss the relevant facts and the Court 
of Appeals discussion in In re Trenasia J.  Part IV will focus on 
 
7 Merril Sobie, supra note 1.   
8 In re Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d 1228 (N.Y. 1996).  
9 Id. at 1231.  
10 Id. 
11 Id.  The other factors that the court considers are the frequency of the contact, the nature 
and extent of the control exercised by the respondent, and the duration of the contact.  In re 
Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d 378, 383 (N.Y. 2015).  
12 In re Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d 377 (N.Y. 2014). 
13 Id. at 378.  
14 Id.  
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when a non-parent, non-legal guardian can be a PLR, and which 
circumstances constitute temporary versus non-temporary care of a 
child for these purposes.  It will also discuss the failure of the court in 
In re Trenasia J. to apply the factors properly, and why that decision 
is problematic for future PLR findings where the court must make a 
well-informed determination that rests on the factual record before it.  
Finally, this note will conclude with a brief summary. 
II.  BACKGROUND  
Child abuse and neglect are recognized as serious, ongoing 
societal problems and, therefore, are addressed by our legislatures 
and courts.  The U.S. Department for Health and Human Services 
published a Child Maltreatment Report for 2013,15 which presented 
national data about child abuse and neglect in the United States 
during federal fiscal year 2013.16  Perpetrators of abuse or neglect 
who were related to, but not parents of, their victims made up 10.4% 
of abuse relationships, and those who were the unmarried partner of 
the parent constituted 7.6% of abuse relationships.17  This data 
establishes that family members and significant others of parents 
account for a large portion of abuse and neglect.18  The largest 
perpetrator category was that of biological parents, which accounted 
for 88.6% of relationships.19 
A child’s biological parent or legal parent is readily 
determinable and, clearly, the parent is primarily responsible for the 
care of his/her children.  Thus, earlier New York laws protecting 
children from neglect and abuse focused on a parent, guardian, or 
other person living with the child as the primary persons that can be 
proper respondents in a Family Court proceeding.20  The 1922 Family 
Court Act did include non-parental persons who lived with the child, 
encompassing those persons within the statute’s purview.21  
However, “a person who lives with the child” is both under-
inclusive—because it would not encompass a person who is legally 
 
15 CHILDREN’S BUREAU, Child Maltreatment 2013 (Jan. 2015), 
https://www.acf.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/cb/cm2013.pdf. 
16 Id.   
17 Id. at 66.  
18 Id. 
19 Id.  
20 Merril Sobie, supra note 1.   
21 Id. 
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responsible yet does not live with the child—and over-inclusive—
because not every person who lives with a child is a PLR.22   
Parental functions are not always performed by parents, and 
non-parental caretakers should not be excluded from prosecution 
under the statute simply because of their non-parental status.23 
Therefore, the 1962 Family Court Act broadened the category of non-
parental caretakers who could be prosecuted for neglect or abuse by 
adding the language “other person legally responsible” when it 
enacted subdivision (g) of Section 1012 in the Family Court Act.24  
This catch-all provision ensures that children are protected from 
persons who may cause them harm, even if those persons are not 
legally or biologically related to the children. 
By way of comparison, other states have adopted different 
requirements for being a PLR for the care of a child.  The statutory 
definitions of PLR for a child in other jurisdictions vary.  
Nonetheless, language frequently incorporates those taking care of 
the child, “exercising control over the child, and adults residing 
within the child’s home.”25  In jurisdictions with the language quoted 
above, the statutes seek to impose a legal duty on those who are in a 
position of taking on parental responsibilities.26  In New Jersey, the 
relevant statute defines PLR as “any person who has assumed 
responsibility for the care, custody, or control of a child.”27  The New 
 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Kate Brittle, Note, Child Abuse by Another Name: Why the Child Welfare System Is the 
Best Mechanism in Place to Address the Problem of Juvenile Prostitution, 36 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1339, 1357 (2008). 
Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, § 901(3) (West 2006) (responsible party is “a 
person or persons in a position of trust, authority, supervision or control 
over a child”); Iowa Code Ann. § 232.68(7)(b) (2006) (responsible 
person includes “[a] relative or any other person with whom the child 
resides and who assumes care or supervision of the child”); Ky. Rev. 
Stat. Ann. § 600.020(42) (LexisNexis 1999) (“‘Person exercising 
custodial control or supervision’ means a person. . .that has assumed the 
role and responsibility of a parent or guardian for the child, but that does 
not necessarily have legal custody of the child.”); Miss. Code Ann. § 43-
21-105(g) (West 2007) (“ ‘Custodian’ means any person having the 
present care or custody of a child whether such person be a parent or 
otherwise.”).  
Id.  
26 Id. at 1358-59. 
27 Definitions of Child Abuse and Neglect, CHILD WELFARE INFORMATION GATEWAY 
(2016), https://www.childwelfare.gov/systemwide/laws_policies/statutes/define.cfm.  
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Jersey statute also lists examples of parents or guardians, which 
include “a teacher, employee, or volunteer of an institution who is 
responsible for the child’s welfare, regardless of whether or not the 
person is responsible.”28  Similarly, the analogous Arkansas statute 
defines persons responsible for the child as:  
A parent, guardian, custodian, or foster parent, a 
person age 18 or older living in the home with a child, 
whether related or unrelated to the child, any person 
who is entrusted with the child’s care by a parent, 
guardian, custodian, or foster parent, including, but 
not limited to: an agent or employee of a public or 
private residential home, child care facility, or public 
or private school, a significant other of the child’s 
parent, or any person legally responsible for the 
child’s welfare. The term “significant other” means a 
person with whom the parent shares a household or 
who has a relationship with the parent that results in 
the person acting in loco parentis with respect to the 
parent’s child or children, regardless of living 
arrangements.29 
The Arkansas statute makes explicit who is a PLR for the care 
of a child.  It defines those persons who are responsible, while also 
listing some examples of persons that the Arkansas law would find 
responsible for a child.  Both the New Jersey statute and the Arkansas 
statute leave little room for interpretation.  These statutes are more 
detailed, developed, and practical than New York’s PLR statute, 
which simply states that other PLRs for the care of a child are within 
the family court’s jurisdiction. 
In New York, the “spirit and purpose” of Section 1012(g), 
that parental functions are not always performed by parents, must be 
adhered to by our courts in order to further the legislative intent.30  
Parenting in a general sense involves caring for a child, and PLRs do 
just that. Section 1012(g) was enacted to provide protection to those 
children who are abused or neglected by, not only their parents, but 
also those non-parents who take on a parental role.31  This catch-all 
 
28 Id. 
29 Id. 
30 Merril Sobie, supra note 1.   
31 Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1230. 
5
Gordon: Redefining the Standard
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2017
522 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 33 
provision ensures that children are protected from persons who may 
cause them harm, even if those persons are not legally or biologically 
related to the children.  
III.  IN RE TRENASIA J. 
The New York Court of Appeals recently held in In re 
Trenasia J. that the evidence presented in the child protective 
proceeding before the family court was sufficient to establish that the 
child’s uncle was a PLR for the child at the time that the child was 
allegedly abused.32  The evidence established that the child was in her 
uncle’s home on several occasions, occasionally spent the night at his 
home, and saw him at family functions.33  The evidence also 
established that the child had a close relationship with her uncle.34 
A.  Factual and Procedural Background  
In February 2011, the Administration for Children’s Services 
(“ACS”) filed child abuse and neglect petitions against Frank J., the 
child’s uncle through marriage.35  The petitions alleged that he 
“forcefully attempted to have sexual intercourse” with the child while 
she was taking a shower36 during an overnight visit at Frank J.’s 
home on December 31, 2010.37  Frank J. moved to dismiss the 
petition, arguing that the family court did not have jurisdiction 
because he was not a proper respondent under the Family Court 
Act.38  As previously discussed, a proper respondent under section 
1012(a) includes a parent or other PLR for the care of the child who 
is alleged to have abused or neglected the child.39  Specifically, Frank 
J. argued that he was not a PLR “because he was neither the guardian 
nor custodian of the child, and she was never a member of his 
 
32 Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 378.  
33 Id. at 380.  
34 Id. at 380.  
35 Id. at 378.  Frank J. is the father of three children (the “J.” children), who were also 
named in the court proceeding, and is charged with derivative neglect of his children 
stemming from this incident.  Id.   
36 Id. 
37 Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 378. 
38 Id. at 379. 
39 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(a) (McKinney 2016). 
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household.”40  Based on the evidence presented at Frank J.’s hearing, 
the Court of Appeals found that there was “record support” for the 
family court’s decision and affirmed the finding that Frank J. was a 
PLR.41  In evaluating “the frequency and nature of the contact,” and 
“the duration of the respondent’s contact with the child,” the Court of 
Appeals determined that the record established that the child was 
staying at Frank J.’s house for a week preceding the incident.42  
Additionally, the Court of Appeals determined that the “total contacts 
between Frank J. and the child were significant” because of the 
repeated times the child spent the night at his home (four), visited his 
home (between eight and nine times), and interacted with him at 
various family functions.43 
The Kings County Family Court denied Frank J.’s motion to 
dismiss.44  The court heard testimony from the child’s mother and the 
responding police officer and determined that Frank J. was a PLR 
within the meaning of section 1012(g).45  Subsequently, at the fact-
finding hearing, where the child, the responding police officer, and 
Frank J. testified, the family court held that Frank J. abused the child 
“by committing an act of attempted sexual abuse in the [s]econd 
[d]egree.”46  At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found that the 
testimony of both the child and the responding officer were factually 
equivalent to the allegations of abuse stated in the police report, 
which were that Frank J. allegedly attempted to forcefully have 
sexual intercourse with the child.47  Frank J. rebutted the allegations 
and testified that “the child had become upset when he scolded her 
for eating in one of the bedrooms.”48  Nonetheless, the court denied 
his motion and found him to be a PLR.  
Frank J. appealed to Appellate Division, Second Department, 
and the Second Department affirmed the family court decision.49  The 
Second Department stated that “[c]ontrary to [Frank J.’s] contention, 
the family court correctly found him to be a person legally 
 
40 Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 379. 
41 Id. at 380. 
42 Id. 
43 Id.  
44 Id at 379.  
45 Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 379.  
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
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responsible for his niece . . . within the meaning of the Family Court 
Act.”50  Frank J. appealed to the Court of Appeals, and his motion for 
leave to appeal was granted.51   
B.  Court of Appeals Discussion of In re Yolanda D 
In In re Yolanda D., the Court of Appeals recognized that 
parenting functions are not always performed by a 
parent but may be discharged by other persons, 
including custodians, guardians and paramours, who 
perform caretaking duties commonly associated with 
parents. Thus, the common thread running through the 
various categories of persons legally responsible for a 
child’s care is that these persons serve as the 
functional equivalent of parents.52 
By making this recognition, the court elaborated on the PLR 
provision of section 1012(g) and made clear that, although one may 
not be the child’s parent, one may fit into another appropriate 
category in which one is performing traditional functions that a 
parent would perform.  
In In re Yolanda D., the court held that “determining whether 
a particular person has acted as the functional equivalent of a parent 
is a discretionary, fact-intensive inquiry which will vary according to 
the particular circumstances of each case.”53  In re Yolanda D. 
addressed whether an uncle, who was named a respondent in a family 
court proceeding, was a PLR for his twelve-year-old niece during her 
summer visits to his Pennsylvania home.54  The child visited the 
respondent six to seven times during the summer of 1991, and three 
to four of those visits were overnight stays.55  The record established 
that the child visited her uncle during the summer for two weekends a 
month.56  The child and her mother lived in New York, and when the 
child spent her summers in Pennsylvania, her mother did not travel 
 
50 In re Trenasia J., 966 N.Y.S.2d 875 (App. Div. 2d Dep’t 2013). 
51 Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 379. 
52 Id. at 381. 
53 Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1231.  
54 Id. at 1232.  
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 1232.  
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with her.57  The uncle also spent time with the child when he visited 
her home in New York.58  The lower court determined that the uncle 
was “regularly in the same household as [the child] during the 
relevant time, an environment he controlled, and he regarded his 
relationship with [the child] as close and familial.”59  Further, he 
permitted the child “to stay overnight in his home, [thereby] 
provid[ing] shelter, a traditional parental function, in an area 
geographically distant from the child’s own household.”60  Because 
the uncle’s contacts were substantial (two weekends a month during 
the summer), and he took on the role of a parent during the times the 
child visited, the court found the uncle to be a PLR and therefore a 
proper respondent in a family court proceeding.61  
The Court of Appeals in In re Trenasia J. examined at great 
length its seminal 1996 decision in In re Yolanda D.  Specifically, the 
Court of Appeals in In re Trenasia J. focused on the factors 
established in In re Yolanda D. to be considered in a PLR 
determination.  These factors include: (1) “the frequency and nature 
of the contact;” (2) “the nature and extent of the control exercised by 
the respondent over the child’s environment;” (3) “the duration of the 
respondent’s contact with the child;” and (4) “the respondent’s 
relationship to the child’s parent(s).”62   
The Court of Appeals in In re Trenasia J. clearly identified 
the relevant factors established by the In re Yolanda D. court before 
applying them to the case at hand.  The Court of Appeals recognized 
that, in determining whether the first factor is met, courts should 
evaluate the total amount of contact between the respondent and the 
child.63  When evaluating the second factor—the nature and extent of 
the control exercised by the respondent over the child’s 
 
57 Id. 
58 Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1232.   
59 Id.  
60 Id. 
61 Id.  
62 In re Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d 377,380 (N.Y. 2014). 
63 Id. at 381.  With respect to the first factor, courts will find that the more often the 
contacts in the months leading up to the incident, including interactions at family functions, 
the more likely the respondent will be considered a PLR because the person had a greater 
opportunity to provide care to the child, analogous to that of a parent.  Id.  However, in 
conjunction with the frequency and nature of the contact, come the actual responsibilities 
that the respondent had for the child’s care, which would be relevant to the second factor. Id. 
Absent caretaker responsibilities analogous to that of a parent, a respondent will not be held 
a PLR for the care of a child.  Id.   
9
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environment— courts should consider: (a) the location where the 
alleged abuse and/or neglect occurred; (b) who else was present at the 
time of the alleged abuse and/or neglect; and (c) the respondent’s 
responsibilities for the care of the child.64  In considering the third 
factor—the  duration of the respondent’s contact with the child--
careful attention should be given to the extent of the contact as well 
as the frequency and continuance of that contact.65  Lastly, with 
respect to the fourth factor—the respondent’s relationship to the 
child’s parent—courts should analyze the familial relationship.  None 
of these factors is dispositive; rather, each should be weighed in 
relation to the particular facts and circumstances of each case.66   
C.  Court of Appeals Discussion: In re Trenasia J. 
The Court of Appeals failed to properly apply the law from In 
re Yolanda D. to the facts in In re Trenasia J. when it held that Frank 
J. was a PLR under Family Court Act § 1012(g).67 Regarding “the 
frequency and nature of the contact,” and “the duration of the 
respondent’s contact with the child,” the responding police officer 
testified that the child had stayed at Frank J.’s home the week leading 
up to the incident.68  The child’s mother also testified that the child 
spent time with Frank J. eight or nine times during the year before the 
incident, and four of those visits were overnight.69  With respect to 
“the nature and extent of the control exercised by the respondent over 
the child’s environment,” the incident in question occurred during an 
overnight visit at Frank J.’s home while he was the only adult 
present.70  According to testimony from the child’s mother, the 
child’s biological aunt usually cared for the child when she was at the 
aunt’s home.71  When the aunt was not there, then Frank J. was 
expected to care for the child.72  The final factor the court discussed 
 
64 Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 381. 
65 Id.  For example, the court might appropriately consider that a child who goes to her 
uncle’s home every day after school, visits him on the weekend, and sees him at family 
functions satisfies this factor, although it is not outcome determinative.  Id.  
66 Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 381.  
67 Id. at 380. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
71 Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 382. 
72 Id.  
10
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was the “respondent’s relationship to the child’s parent(s).”73  Frank 
J. is the child’s uncle through marriage.74  The Court of Appeals 
concluded that there was “record support” for the lower court’s 
determination that Frank J. was a PLR under Family Court Act § 
1012(g), and therefore the approach was consistent with In re 
Yolanda D. 75  
Judge Rivera, dissented in In re Trenasia J., stating that the 
record was devoid of facts supporting a PLR determination based on 
the factors established in In re Yolanda D., and for that reason, chose 
not to join the majority.76  Judge Rivera considered the record 
inadequate to make a proper determination as to Frank J.’s status as a 
PLR under the statute because there was no evidence regarding the 
nature and duration of his caretaker responsibilities, and the Family 
Court relied excessively on the familial relationship.77  The purpose 
of the inquiry into the factual record in a section 1012(g) PLR 
assessment is to determine the factors set forth in In re Yolanda D.78  
However, according to Judge Rivera, the amount of contact that 
Frank J. had with the child was not clearly established, and his 
caretaking responsibilities were not specific or definite, as required 
and essential to a section 1012(g) analysis.79 
IV.  DETERMINING WHEN A NON-PARENT, NON-LEGAL 
GUARDIAN IS LEGALLY RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CARE OF A 
CHILD IN A CIVIL CHILD ABUSE CASE 
The following section will broadly diagram the courts’ 
interpretation of those persons who would, and those who would not 
be considered PLRs under New York’s Family Court Act, and the 
evolution of that interpretation as a result of the In re Trenasia J., 
decision.  It will also examine what is now considered “temporary” or 
“fleeting care” of a child for the purpose of being named a respondent 
in a family court proceeding.  The Family Court Act defines PLR in a 
family court proceeding but, because the determination is 
 
73 Id. at 379. 
74 Id. at 378. 
75 Id. at 380. 
76 Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 381 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
77 Id.  
78 Id.  
79 Id. at 381-82.  
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discretionary, and rests on a fact-intensive inquiry, varying 
interpretations exist.80 
A.  There is a Fine Line Between Persons Who Are 
Legally Responsible for a Child and Persons Who 
Are Not Legally Responsible 
As previously stated, the respondent in a civil proceeding in 
family court who is accused of abuse or neglect of a child must be a 
PLR for that child.81  The Family Court Act Section 1012(a) defines 
respondent to “include[] any parent or other person legally 
responsible for a child’s care who is alleged to have abused or 
neglected such child.”82  When a court is deciding whether a 
respondent is a PLR, there are no predetermined statutory answers 
because of the fact-specific nature of a PLR finding.83  Courts 
determine who is a PLR and the inquiry depends on the facts in the 
record.  Thus, court findings can differ from one another.  
A child’s parent can be determined with ease, and the statute 
clearly encompasses those persons; however, determining whether a 
non-parent is a PLR for a child’s care is more complicated. Section 
1012(g) of the Act states: 
‘Person legally responsible’ includes the child’s 
custodian, guardian, [or] any other person responsible 
for the child’s care at the relevant time. Custodian may 
include any person continually or at regular intervals 
found in the same household as the child when the 
conduct of such person causes or contributes to the 
abuse or neglect of the child.84 
A person who is found to be a PLR will, in essence, resemble a 
parent in many ways.  Although a PLR may not be a legal or 
biological “parent,” the PLR’s actions and conduct may be analogous 
to those of a parent.  For example, the Third Department places a 
strong emphasis on the fact that, for all intents and purposes, the 
respondent acts as a parent to the subject child by performing 
 
80 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(g) (McKinney 2016). 
81 Id. at § 1012(a). 
82 Id. 
83 Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 380. 
84 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(g) (McKinney 2016). 
12
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parental functions.85  By staying overnight in the child’s home, going 
grocery shopping, disciplining the child, cooking meals, and buying 
gifts, the respondent is functionally the same as a parent.86  
In In re Mikayla U.,87 the respondent was the mother’s live-in 
boyfriend who performed parental functions, and the Third 
Department held that he was a PLR for the children’s care.88  The 
record showed that he “was the functional equivalent of a parent in a 
familial or household setting” because he frequently put the children 
to bed, stayed overnight at the children’s home, talked with the 
children, took them to his house where they stayed overnight, and 
one of the children considered him to be a father figure.89  This 
decision was consistent with the court’s decision in In re Yolanda D. 
because both respondents were responsible for many aspects of the 
child’s care and took on those responsibilities in a familial setting, 
whether in the absence of the child’s parent as in In re Yolanda D. or 
with the mother’s occasional presence as in In re Mikayla U.90  
In In re Nicole SS.,91 the Third Department held similarly to 
its decision in Mikayla U.: that the mother’s live-in boyfriend, who 
was not the biological father of the children, was a PLR for the 
children’s care, because he acted as a parent to the children by 
performing parental functions.92  The respondent lived with the 
children for roughly five years, during which time he performed 
parental functions such as going grocery shopping, providing gifts to 
the children, disciplining the children, and eating family meals with 
the children.93  The court found that based on the respondent’s 
regular presence in the children’s household, and his parental 
relationship with them, he was a proper respondent under section 
1012(g) and subject to jurisdiction in the Family Court of Chemung 
County.94 
 
85 In re Mikayla U., 699 N.Y.S.2d 145,146 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1999). 
86 Id. 
87 699 N.Y.S.2d 145 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1999).  
88 Id. at 146.  
89 Id. at 146. 
90 Mikayla U., 699 N.Y.S.2d at 146.  
91 In re Nicole SS., 745 N.Y.S.2d 128 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 2002). 
92 Id. at 129.  
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
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By contrast, the Third Department in In re Faith GG., which 
predates In re Yolanda D.,95 held that the respondent, the mother’s 
fiancé, was not a PLR for the subject child under section 1012(g) 
because he maintained a separate residence and did not come into 
contact with the child very much.  Respondent continued to live 
separately from the subject child and the mother and only saw the 
child periodically, such as when he was asked to babysit or when he 
occasionally stayed overnight once or twice a month.96  The term 
“any person” was interpreted broadly and had been construed to 
include “persons acting in loco parentis97 or as the functional 
equivalent of a parent in a household setting.”98  On its face, an 
analysis of whether a person is acting in loco parentis resembles a 
determination of whether a person is the functional equivalent of a 
parent.99  However, an independent analysis must be done under each 
scenario.100  A person deemed to be the functional equivalent of a 
parent need not intentionally assume responsibility for the care of a 
child and can temporarily provide care and still be the functional 
equivalent of a parent.101  The difference between the two 
determinations is that a person acting in loco parentis intends to be 
legally responsible for the care of a child on a permanent basis, but 
the functional equivalent of a parent temporarily cares for a child 
with no intent to do so permanently.102 
In In re Yolanda D., the court interpreted section 1012(g) 
broadly, by holding that the definition of PLR applies to those 
persons acting in loco parentis as well as those persons who are the 
functional equivalent of a parent when the care given coincides with 
that of a parent and occurs in a household setting.103  The uncle in In 
re Yolanda D. sought to confine the catch-all provision in the statute, 
“any other person responsible for the child’s care at the relevant 
 
95 This decision predates Yolanda D.  Therefore, the factors established in that case no 
longer apply.  In re Faith GG., 578 N.Y.S.2d 705, 706 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1992). 
96 Faith GG., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 706. 
97 Legal Encyclopedia, Cornell Encyclopedia Legal Information Institute, Definition of 
Loco Parentis (last visited Feb. 14, 2017), 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/in_loco_parentis.  Loco Parentis is Latin for “in the place 
of a parent.”  Id.  
98 Faith GG., 578 N.Y.S.2d at 706. 
99 Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1231.  
100 Id. 
101 Id.  
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
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time,” to either those persons who assume a parental role while also 
continuously being in the child’s home or to persons acting in loco 
parentis.104  The Court of Appeals in In re Yolanda D. rejected that 
argument and determined that the “narrow interpretation” imposed by 
the uncle would in effect be the definition of “custodian” under the 
statute.105  The statute defines a custodian as “any person continually 
or at regular intervals found in the same household as the child when 
the conduct of such person causes or contributes to the abuse or 
neglect of the child.”106 Therefore, the uncle’s proposed interpretation 
in In re Yolanda D. would make a PLR and a custodian the same 
person under the law.107  In addition, that interpretation of the statute 
would serve as a restriction applying to those who are continually in 
the same household of the child, but the statute is meant to be more 
expansive and include those persons who do not fit within a 
particular category but nonetheless are within section 1012(g)’s 
purview.108  The Court of Appeals did not want to limit the scope of 
section 1012(g) and instead determined that the care must be 
comparable to that of a parent and occur in a household setting.109  
The Third Department, in other decisions since In re Faith GG, still 
centered on whether the respondent stands in loco parentis or acts as 
the functional equivalent of a parent in a familial setting.110  The 
focus on a respondent standing in loco parentis is not necessary to a 
proper PLR finding as discussed in In re Yolanda D., and the proper 
inquiry is whether the respondent is the functional equivalent of a 
parent and therefore a PLR.111  
B.  How Courts Weigh “Temporary Care,” “Non-
Temporary Care,” and “Relevant Times” 
The Court of Appeals in In re Yolanda D. held that a person 
who temporarily cares for a child would be subject to a family court 
 
104 Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1230. 
105 Id.  
106 N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(g) (McKinney 2016). 
107 Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1230. 
108 Id. 
109 Id. 
110 In re Marta B., 650 N.Y.S.2d 371, 372 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1996) (stating that § 
1012(g) “encompasses those acting in loco parentis or as the functional equivalent of a 
parent” and is intended to be narrowly interpreted to refer to both.). 
111 Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1231. 
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proceeding as a respondent if he or she acted as the functional 
equivalent of a parent.112  In determining whether a respondent is the 
functional equivalent of a parent and therefore a PLR, New York 
courts examine the actual care given regardless of whether the 
respondent is permanently or temporarily caring for the child.113  
When the respondent acts as the functional equivalent of a parent, he 
is a PLR and can be subject to a family court proceeding.114  With 
respect to temporary or fleeting care, the Court of Appeals in In re 
Yolanda held that persons such as teachers, babysitters, and 
supervisors of play-dates assume “fleeting” or “temporary” care of a 
child and do not fit the statutory definition of PLR under Family 
Court Act 1012(g).115 
A babysitter is not a PLR because his/her job is to temporarily 
care for the child until the parent returns but the parent does not 
relinquish control to the babysitter.116  The Court of Appeals in In re 
Yolanda examined the child’s dwelling during the incidents of 
abuse/neglect as an important factor establishing temporary care.117  
Specifically, the following facts related to dwelling supported the 
finding that the uncle was a PLR for the child’s care: (1) the child 
visited every other week in the summer; (2) the visits were planned to 
allow for the uncle to spend time with the child without her mother; 
and (3) the child was in a location remote from her domicile.118  The 
uncle cared for the child during a specific time period, but the care he 
gave was only temporary because he did not live with the child in her 
place of domicile. Unlike a babysitter, his responsibilities did not end 
when the night was over, but persisted until the child left his control 
and returned to her place of domicile in New York with her mother.  
Therefore, for the period that the child went to visit him in 
Pennsylvania, his care was analogous to that of a parent, and the 
court deemed him a PLR.  The uncle intended to support and care for 
 
112 Id. 
113 Id.  “[F]or example, a paramour may be subject to child protective proceedings as a 
respondent even if the paramour has no intention of caring for the child on a permanent 
basis.”  Id.  
114 Id. 
115 Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1231. 
116 Oral Argument Transcript, Court of Appeals of the State of New York, Oral Argument 
In the Matter of Trenasia J. (February 11, 2015), 
https://www.nycourts.gov/ctapps/arguments/2015/Feb15/Transcripts/021115-30-Oral-
Argument-Transcript.pdf [hereinafter “Oral Argument Transcript”].  
117 Yolanda D., 673 N.E.2d at 1232. 
118 Id.  
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his niece for the weeks that she visited him, essentially taking the 
child’s mother’s place and acting as the functional equivalent of a 
parent during that time period.119  
Likewise, in In re Leticia TP.,120 the Kings County Family 
Court found that a grandfather’s presence in the child’s home in and 
of itself was not enough to establish a PLR finding, but other factors 
indicated that he was indeed a PLR.121  The respondent, the biological 
grandfather of the subject child, asserted that his presence in the 
home, with nothing more, was insufficient to establish he was a 
PLR.122  The court did not disagree with this assertion, but found that 
there were numerous factors, in addition to his presence in the home, 
that indicated the respondent was a PLR.  Namely, the court 
determined that the respondent: (1) exercised significant control over 
the environment of the subject children; (2) lived in the respondent’s 
apartment with their mother; (3) cooked and ate meals with the 
children; (4) disciplined the children; and (5) engaged in other 
caretaker responsibilities equivalent to those of a parent.123  Also, 
during the alleged incident, the respondent was the only person 
responsible for the subject child.124  The respondent’s familial 
relationship with, the nature and extent of his control over, as well as 
his responsibilities for the children were so significant that the court 
determined that the care was not temporary, and the respondent was a 
PLR.125 
Last, in In re Anthony YY,126 the Third Department held that 
the respondent great-grandmother was not a PLR because, although 
she was a part of the subject child’s household, she did not act in loco 
parentis, nor was she the functional equivalent of a parent.127  The 
record was devoid of the extent of the respondent’s care for the child 
and established that she babysat on two occasions, but there was no 
proof that she acted in a “parental role” during those two 
occasions.128  Therefore, the Third Department likened her acts to the 
 
119 Id. 
120 In re Leticia TP., 23 Misc. 3d 1111(A) (2008). 
121 Id. at *3. 
122 Id. at *1.   
123 Id.  
124 Id. 
125 Leticia TP., 23 Misc. 3d at *1.  
126 In re Anthony YY., 608 N.Y.S.2d 580 (App. Div. 3d Dep’t 1994).  
127 Id. at 581.  
128 Id. 
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temporary care of a babysitter.129  Because a fine line distinguishes a 
person who is a PLR and one who is not, the exact caretaking 
responsibilities of the alleged PLR are significant.  Furthermore, 
because courts have immense discretion, holdings are inconsistent. 
V.  A RESPONSIBLE PERSON SHOULD NOT QUALIFY AS A PLR 
UNDER THE STATUTE ABSENT FACTS SURROUNDING THE 
NATURE AND EXTENT OF THEIR CARETAKING 
RESPONSIBILITIES ESTABLISHING THAT HE PERFORMED 
PARENTAL FUNCTIONS 
In In re Trenasia J., the Court of Appeals determined that 
Frank J. was a PLR for the child, when really he was just a 
responsible person.130  The determination that Frank J. was a PLR 
should have rested on more facts regarding the nature and extent of 
Frank J.’s caretaker responsibilities, and less consideration should 
have been afforded to the familial relationship.  Frank J. did not need 
to have a familial relationship with his niece in order to be a PLR 
because this relationship is merely one factor among many that the 
court considers in making a PLR determination.  The record was 
devoid of facts suggesting that Frank J. had parental responsibilities 
for the child and how often he was looking after the child.  Although 
he may have been in the child’s presence at family functions and 
when she visited him, the record does not indicate that he had any 
parental responsibilities for her because caring for the child was the 
aunt’s responsibility.  Thus, the record was insufficient to establish 
that Frank J. was a PLR under the Family Court Act. 
The Court of Appeals in In re Trenasia J. focused on three 
attenuated facts to support its PLR determination: the familial 
relationship between Frank J. and the child, the number of visits that 
the child had with Frank J., and what allegedly occurred during the 
incident in question.  Considering these facts together, the Court of 
Appeals assumed that similar interactions occurred between the child 
and Frank J. on other visits.131  However, the only direct testimony 
came from the child’s mother, who testified that her sister cared for 
the child and Frank J. cared for the child when her sister was not 
 
129 Id. 
130 In re Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 378; Oral Argument Transcript, supra note 115.  
131 In re Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 378. 
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there.132  The mother also testified to the amount of contact her child 
had with Frank J.133  None of the facts set forth above, even taken 
together, established that Frank J. was a PLR and proper respondent.  
Frank J.’s relationship with the child in In re Trenasia J. was 
not parallel to the uncle’s relationship with the child in In re Yolanda 
D.; rather, it was analogous to a person who merely assumes 
temporary care of a child.134  Frank J. had no intention of caring for 
the child at all.135   Without additional facts on the record, a 
determination that a respondent is the functional equivalent of a 
parent cannot simply rest on the respondent’s watching the child on 
one occasion.  The only evidence in the record that demonstrated 
contact between Frank J. and the child was the incident that resulted 
in the court proceeding.136  Hence, Frank J.’s care is akin to that of a 
temporary caregiver or babysitter.  He saw the child between eight 
and nine times the entire year, he had no intention of caring for the 
child, and there were no additional facts indicating he was 
responsible for the child.137  The Court of Appeals in In re Trenasia 
J. placed undue significance on the incident in question, whereas in 
In re Yolanda D., In re Mikayla U., and In re Nicole SS., the courts 
focused primarily on the frequency and duration of the contact 
between the respondent and the child and looked at the alleged abuse 
and neglect over a period of time and not from one isolated 
incident.138   
The Court of Appeals distinguished Frank J. from a babysitter 
by emphasizing his familial relationship with the child.  The Court of 
Appeals explained that the relationship that Frank J. had to the child 
was through marriage.139  Although there is a family tie between the 
child and Frank J.—which would not exist if Frank J. were merely a 
babysitter and unrelated to the child—this tie is not enough to 
establish that he is a PLR.  A babysitter is paid to come and go and is 
employed for a specified period of time.  When a parent or guardian 
hires a babysitter, the parent does not relinquish his/her parental 
 
132 Id. 
133 Id.  
134 Id.  
135 Id. at 379.   
136 In re Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 380.  
137 Id.   
138 Id. at 381.  
139 Id. at 380-81. 
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authority to the babysitter.  Likewise, in In re Trenasia J., the child’s 
mother did not relinquish her authority to Frank J.  Although Frank J. 
was related to the child, this alone should not be outcome 
determinative, because there are other Yolanda factors to be weighed.  
A proper determination of whether a respondent’s actions are 
analogous to parenting, and whether he/she should be considered a 
respondent in a child protective proceeding, requires “a well-
developed factual record of the nature and extent of the respondent’s 
caretaker responsibilities.”140  Indeed, living with the child, taking on 
the role of a parent, disciplining a child, and being a constant 
overnight visitor in the child’s home, are all acts that lead courts to 
determine that the respondent is a PLR.141  Yet, in In re Trenasia J., 
Frank J. merely cared for the child by “default”142 because it was 
primarily the aunt’s responsibility to care for the child.143  The record 
is devoid of facts describing Frank J.’s responsibilities when he cared 
for the child, or how frequently he was solely in charge of the child 
(factoring in overnight visits) during the aunt’s absence.144  Since a 
PLR determination is fact-specific, the frequency and nature of Frank 
J.’s contact with the child in the aunt’s absence were not established, 
yet this information is critical in a PLR analysis.  Therefore, in this 
circumstance, the record was insufficient to make a determination 
that the respondent was a PLR. 
Judge Rivera’s dissenting opinion in In re Trenasia J. is more 
compelling than the majority opinion because, as in Yolanda, her 
opinion is based upon a review of Frank J.’s actual caretaker 
responsibilities.145   It is clear that The Court of Appeals did not 
follow the precedent set in In re Yolanda, which required the court to 
look at the factors and make a determination based on a well-
developed factual record of the caretaking responsibilities of the 
PLR.  The dissent argued that the record in this case lacked evidence 
as to Frank J.’s specific caretaker responsibilities and, therefore, his 
care was akin to that of a babysitter, and not a PLR.146  To be precise, 
Judge Rivera stated that the record was “vague” regarding Frank J.’s 
 
140 Id.  
141 Mikayla U., 699 N.Y.S.2d at 146; Nichole SS., 745 N.Y.S.2d at 129. 
142 Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 383. 
143 Id.  
144 Id. at 381.  
145 Id. at 382 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
146 Id.  
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caretaker responsibilities for the child, and it could not be established 
that Frank J. acted as the functional equivalent of a parent.147  The 
dissent further stated that “the majority’s analysis fails to consider 
Frank J.’s actual responsibilities for the child’s care during any of the 
visits to the home, or the nature of the interactions during the times 
when they are supposedly in contact.”148  Unlike the majority, Judge 
Rivera emphasized that all of these factors, and not just one, are 
indispensable and must be considered in a PLR finding pursuant to 
section 1012(g).149  Judge Rivera continued, “[o]f course, it is simply 
not possible to assess the relevant facts because the record here is 
best characterized by its sheer vagueness regarding the contacts and 
Frank J.’s role.”150  As Judge Rivera recognized, the record lacked 
important details essential to determining whether Frank J. was the 
functional equivalent of a parent and therefore a PLR for the child.151  
Even if the underlying incident could be proven, it could have been 
an isolated incident when Frank J. was left alone with the child.  
Therefore, Frank J. “did not have the type of control and 
responsibility for the child that was crucial to the PLR finding in In 
re Yolanda D.”152 
Without a well-developed factual record of the caretaker 
responsibilities and parental role that the respondent has for the child, 
a finding that the respondent is a PLR is subjective because what one 
may think qualifies as caretaking, another may not. The courts in In 
re Leticia TP and Matter of Anthony YY both indicated that the 
presence of the respondent in the child’s household was not 
enough.153  As previously stated, the purpose of section 1012(g) is to 
bring within reach those persons who are legally responsible for the 
care of the child, not just responsible persons.  Persons who are 
members of a child’s household are not, by default, a PLR simply 
because they live under the same roof as that child.  In order to be 
subject to the statute, the person needs to exemplify those salient 
responsibilities articulated in Yolanda.  
 
147 Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 382 (Rivera, J., dissenting).  
148 Id.  
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 381.  
152 Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 383 (Rivera, J., dissenting). 
153 See supra, section III-B. 
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The Kings County Family Court, in finding that Frank J. was 
a PLR, placed “undue significance” on the uncle/niece relationship 
between Frank J. and the child.154  The familial relationship alone 
does not determine whether someone is a PLR.  Persons not legally 
related, but who perform caretaking responsibilities, are still within 
the statute’s reach, as shown in In re Mikayla U.,155 and In re Nichole 
SS.156  The child’s relationship to the respondent is but one factor the 
court should consider in determining whether the respondent is a 
PLR.157  The statutory intent of section 1012(g) was to include those 
individuals who do not have a familial relationship with the child yet 
still provide care for the child.158  After all, it takes a “village” to raise 
a child,159 and the legislature which enacted section 1012(g) 
recognized that parenting functions are not always performed by a 
parent but may be discharged by other persons.160  The Court of 
Appeals should have identified additional factors before concluding 
that Frank J. was a PLR.  For instance, if Frank J. had cared for the 
child on several occasions throughout the year, including overnight 
visits, where he had taken on the role of a parent, by doing homework 
with the child, feeding the child, and providing regular discipline to 
the child,161 Frank J. would clearly be a PLR. 
Based on the facts in the record, Frank J. was a responsible 
person, not a PLR.  Although Frank J. did have a relationship with 
the child’s parent, this alone, with no other factors, was not enough to 
render him a PLR.  Absent the familial relationship, Frank J still 
could have been a PLR because the statute encompasses those who 
are not related to the child and familial relationship is but one factor.  
VI.  CONCLUSION  
The Court of Appeals in In re Trenasia J. was too quick to 
jump to the conclusion that Frank J. was a PLR for the child.  This 
decision is of concern because of its binding implications on the 
 
154 Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 381. 
155 Mikayla U., 699 N.Y.S.2d at 146 
156 Nichole SS., 745 N.Y.S.2d at 129. 
157 Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 381. 
158 Id. 
159 Merril Sobie, supra note 1.   
160 Id. 
161 Trenasia J., 32 N.E.3d at 379.  Frank J. alleged that the child was upset with him 
because he scolded her for eating in the bedroom.  Id.  
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lower courts.  In re Trenasia J. sets a lower threshold, and does not 
follow In re Yolanda, thereby creating a new path for lower courts.  
This new path has a chilling effect, allowing courts to make 
determinations based on little or no evidence of caretaking 
responsibilities.  
Determining whether an individual is a PLR as defined by the 
Family Court Act is a discretionary, fact-intensive inquiry, and the 
Court of Appeals in In re Yolanda D. established clear factors for this 
determination.  No one factor is dispositive.  However, a thorough 
factual record is needed in regard to the personal relationships 
between the child and the respondent, the interactions between the 
respondent and the child, as well as the nature and extent of the 
parental duties tackled by nonparents.  The Family Court Act was 
enacted to protect children from abuse and neglect from the hands of 
those who care for them.162   When a court focuses on just one factor, 
in the absence of any evidence regarding the other factors, its 
determination has the effect of making a single factor dispositive.  
The factual record must speak to more of the factors established in In 
re Yolanda D.  Although all factors do not need to be established, 
there needs to be more than just one, as in the familial relationship in 
In re Trenasia J. 
Essentially, the Court of Appeals in In re Trenasia J. placed 
too much emphasis on the uncle/niece relationship between the child 
and Frank J.  This relationship was of little significance because the 
Family Court Act reaches beyond those who are related to a child, 
and includes other “persons responsible” for the care of a child.  
While Frank J. was a responsible person, the court should not have 
determined he was a PLR because he was merely in charge by 
default.  Moreover, no facts in the record spoke to the responsibilities 
he had for the child, the extent of control exercised by him, or the 
duration of the contact he had with the child.  Considering the limited 
facts in the record, Frank J.’s care of the child, at best, was analogous 
to that of a babysitter. 
While New York’s statute is not crystal clear, it is the courts’ 
responsibility to interpret section 1012(g) and apply it as consistently 
as possible. The problem lies with the statute’s implementation, not 
necessarily with its language. There needs to be more uniformity in 
determining who is a PLR, and who is not, in order to provide 
 
162 Merril Sobie, supra note 1. 
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concrete precedent that courts can rely on in their determinations.  
The statute is all encompassing by including the catchall provision 
for a PLR; however, what it encompasses is unclear and elusive.  As 
in Yolanda, the details of the specific encounters, along with the 
caretaking responsibilities of the PLR, should be described and 
outlined in the record, enabling each court to make a consistent 
determination.  
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